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1. Introduction 
The Stern Review of The Economics of Climate Change (Stern et al., 2006) has caused 
substantial discussion, not least about the validity of the headline conclusion that climate 
change would cause a welfare loss equivalent to a permanent income loss of 5 to 20%. The 
initial responses of many economists (Arrow, 2007; Dasgupta, 2007; Mendelsohn, 2006; 
Nordhaus, 2007a; Nordhaus, 2007b; Pielke Jr, 2007; Tol, 2006b; Tol and Yohe, 2007; 
Weitzman, 2007; Yohe et al., 2007) focused on a variety of shortcomings of the research and 
the choice of the rates of pure time preference and risk aversion, but later reactions (Yohe and 
Tol, 2007; Weitzman, 2008) emphasized that the Stern Review has also brought renewed 
attention to the conceptual and moral difficulties of any economic appraisal of projects to 
limit climate change and its impacts. 
This paper contributes in four ways to the ongoing debate about the conclusions of the Stern 
Review. First, this paper is a sensitivity analysis on the integrated assessment model used to 
derive the conclusions of the review. Second, we extend the analysis conducted by the Stern 
Review with a regionally disaggregated welfare module. Third, we not only calculate the 
difference between scenarios with and without climate impacts, but evaluate specific policies 
in terms of changes in balanced growth equivalents. Fourth, we propose a rigorous definition 
of the balanced growth equivalent, which was sadly lacking from the Stern Review. 
The Stern Review diverged from the usual approaches of calculating the welfare impact of 
climate change employed in the literature (Pearce et al., 1996; Smith et al., 2001) in a number 
of ways. For one, it presented the results of its modeling exercise as changes in balanced 
growth equivalences (cf. Mirrlees and Stern, 1972). Previous studies of climate change had 
presented economic damages either as total impacts for a benchmark scenario (typically, the 
effect of a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide on today’s population and economy), or as 
marginal impacts from the release of greenhouse gas emissions. The introduction of a new 
measure is certainly a refreshing move, but it makes comparison with previous results 
difficult. One could attempt to infer what the results from the Stern Review are in the measure 
units used in previous studies. In this paper we choose the other direction: We use the welfare 
measure used in the Stern Review but instead of using PAGE, the integrated assessment model 
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employed for the Stern Review, we use the FUND model to calculate impacts of climate 
change scenarios. As such, this paper is analyses into how depended the results from the Stern 
Review are on the specific assumptions made in the PAGE model. We also run the model with 
more combinations of input parameters than the Stern Review did, in particular we investigate 
sensitivity to all IPCC SRES scenarios and more discounting schemes. 
Mirrlees and Stern’s (1972) definition of the balanced growth equivalent is for a single 
decision maker. It seems that the Stern Review’s calculation of welfare measures is based on 
globally averaged per capita income and total population figures3. The Stern Review suggests 
that a more appropriate aggregation would take up regional data when deriving the welfare 
measure. Due to time constraints, the Stern Review seems not to have carried out those 
calculations. Here, we do use regional impacts, income, and population data to estimate 
changes in the balanced growth equivalent due to climate change. 
Finally, the Stern Review presented its results as differences between scenarios with no 
impacts from climate change at all and scenarios with climate change impacts. This cannot be 
regarded as an evaluation of policy options: There is no feasible policy option available today 
to avoid all climate change impacts in the future. A more meaningful result is obtained by 
looking at changes of welfare measures that would be achieved from actually possible policy 
options. We attempt to do this by presenting changes in welfare of optimal policy choices in 
comparison to business as usual scenarios that assume no climate change mitigation. 
Section 2 reviews the original definition of balanced growth equivalence and shows our 
extension with non-constant populations, regional disaggregation, and uncertainty. Section 3 
outlines the FUND model. Section 4 presents the numerical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Balanced growth equivalent 
2.1. Basic concept 
Mirrlees and Stern (1972) introduced the concept of a balanced growth equivalent (BGE) as a 
commodity measure of welfare. The thought was that when looking at policy proposals one 
could calculate the change in BGE for a particular policy and use that as a rough first estimate 
whether further investigation of that policy would be warranted or whether the impact of that 
policy would be too small in the first place to warrant further research. The authors 
themselves suggest that there might be many broad economic policy options unexplored that 
                                                     
3 The actual review text is not clear on this point, but subsequent private communication with the Stern Review 
team confirmed this. Then again, different members of the Stern Review have issued contradictory statements, 
and occasionally changed their opinion on technical details. 
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would cause an increase of at least 1% in BGE and propose that those should attain more 
research time. Looking at policy impacts in terms of changes of a commodity welfare measure 
has the additional nice property that changes can be measured, even when the commodity 
measure is based on an ordinal welfare ordering. The BGE as a welfare measure has largely 
been ignored in the economics literature: only 9 papers refer to Mirrlees and Stern (1972) 
according to the Web of Science, and none of these papers develops the BGE further or 
applies it. Stern et al. (2006) appears to be the first application. 
The following will briefly review the original concept with the notation used for this paper. 
Since we will later use a numerical model to run simulations, we use discrete time for the 
model, unlike the original specification of BGE. One key exercise of this paper is to compare 
the effects of various policy options with respect to climate change in terms of welfare 
changes. Policy choices are represented by ω. A specific policy choice ω could for example 
designate one specific carbon tax schedule. While in theory ω can stand for any policy out of 
all possible policy options, the numerical analysis later in the paper will restrict itself to a 
subset of policy options. 
Let welfare for a specific policy ω be 
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where Cω,t is per capita consumption at time t as it results from choosing policy ω, P is 
population, ρ is the utility discount rate, U is the utility function and T is the time up to which 
the analysis is carried out. 
The BGE for policy ω is then defined by solving4 
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4 Note that equation (7) in chapter 6 in the Stern Review defines the BGE as used by Stern et al. (2006, p. 185) 
and thus plays the same role as our equation (2). Unfortunately, equation (7) in the review contains a number of 
errors. It seems to use the utility function for η≠1, while the text before the equation and the definition of the 
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the correct formulation would have been . And finally, this wrong term for consumption at time t 
was then wrongly converted into utility by only putting CBGE into the utility function and then adding gt to 
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for γ(ω), with α being a constant growth rate (that later drops out when changes in γ are 
calculated). 
For a standard constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function 
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with η being the marginal elasticity of consumption, we have an explicit solution for γ 
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Defining the relative change in BGE for two policies ω and ω’ as ∆γ, we get 
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Note that ∆γ is independent of α, so that the change in BGE does not depend on the growth 
rate assumed in the calculation of a specific BGE – as long as the growth rates are the same 
for the two policy choices. 
Note that population is (assumed to be) independent of the policy choice. If population is 
endogenous to the policy decision, one cannot use a welfare function like Equation (1). See 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) and Blackorby et al. (1995). 
2.2. Uncertainty 
We now treat W(ω, s) as a random variable where p(s)  is the probability of state of the world 
s. Expected welfare then is 
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The certainty- and balanced growth equivalent (CBGE) is obtained be replacing W(ω) in (2) 
with expected welfare EW(ω) as defined in (6). The CBGE can then be solved as: 
(7) 
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The CBGE is the initial level of per capita consumption, which, if it grows without any 
uncertainty at some constant rate α, gives the same level of welfare as the expected welfare 
for some policy ω as defined in (6). It is a combination of the certainty equivalence ideas put 
forward by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) with the balanced growth equivalent of Mirrlees 
and Stern (1972). 
The change in the CBGE equals: 
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As before, the growth scenario α cancels. 
2.3. Multiple regions 
In the final step, we introduce multiple regions. Assuming that the global welfare function is 
utilitarian, we have 
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for an analysis with uncertainty. Per capita consumption C and population P are now fed into 
the welfare function for each region r individually. 
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Replacing W(ω) in (2) with the deterministic welfare function that is disaggregated by regions 
WR(ω) gives the equity- and balanced growth equivalent (EBGE) for a specific policy choice. 
This solves as: 
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This combines a measure of inequality very much like Atkinson’s (1970) with the BGE 
concept. The EBGE is the equally distributed (over the regions under consideration) initial per 
capita consumption, growing at a constant rate α that gives the same level of welfare as 
obtained for a specific policy choice ω from the welfare function defined in (9). 
The certainty, equity- and balanced growth equivalent (CEBGE) follows by replacing W(ω) in 
(2) with the expected welfare from the regional disaggregated welfare function as defined in 
(10) for some policy choice ω. This solves as: 
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which is the equally distributed (over the regions under consideration) initial per capita 
consumption growing without uncertainty at a constant rate α, that gives the same welfare 
level as the expected welfare of a certain policy choice ω as obtained by using (10). 
From this it follows that the change in the EBGE between two policy options is 
(13) 
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And the change in the CEBGE between two policy options is 
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(14) 
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Note that in Equation (14), the parameter η has a triple role. It is a measure of the curvature of 
the utility function – more specifically, the consumption elasticity of marginal utility – but it 
functions as the intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption, the rate of risk aversion, 
and the rate of inequity aversion. Below, we refer to η as the rate of risk aversion. 
Tol and Yohe (2007) show a similar derivation, but use the term certainty- and equity-
equivalent annuity because Equation (5) – and hence (8), (13) and (14) – distribute the impact 
equally over time, as well as over states of the world and regions. 
As stated in the introduction, we think that the Stern Review intended to report ∆γCE as 
defined in Equation (14), but they seem to report ∆γ (5) or ∆γC (8) instead. 
3. The Model 
FUND (the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution) is an 
integrated assessment model linking projections of populations, economic activity and 
emissions to a simple carbon cycle and climate model, and to a model predicting and 
monetizing welfare impacts. Climate change welfare impacts are monetarized in 1995 dollars 
and are modeled over 16 regions. Modeled welfare impacts include agriculture, forestry, sea 
level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders influenced by cold and heat stress, malaria, 
dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, and 
unmanaged ecosystems (Link and Tol, 2004). The source code, data, and a technical 
description of the model can be found at http://www.fund-model.org. 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations.  
The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United States of America, 
Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, Central and 
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central America, South America, 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Small Island 
States. Version 3.2, used in this paper, runs from 1950 to 2300 in time steps of one year. The 
primary reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate change impact module. In 
FUND, the welfare impacts of climate change are assumed to depend in part on the impacts 
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during the previous year, reflecting the process of adjustment to climate change.  Because the 
initial values to be used for the year 1950 cannot be approximated very well, both physical 
impacts and monetized welfare impacts of climate change tend to be misrepresented in the 
first few decades of the model runs. The 22nd and 23rd centuries are included to provide a 
proper long-term perspective. 
The period of 1950-1990 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the 
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes and Goldewijk, 1994).  The period 1990-2000 is based on 
observations (http://earthtrends.wri.org).  The climate scenarios for the period 2010-2100 are 
based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and 
IS92f (Leggett et al., 1992).  The 2000-2010 period is interpolated from the immediate past, 
and the period 2100-2300 is extrapolated. 
The scenarios are defined by varied rates of population growth, economic growth, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements, and decarbonization of energy use (autonomous 
carbon efficiency improvements), as well as by emissions of carbon dioxide from land use 
change, methane emissions, and nitrous oxide emissions. 
Emission reduction of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide is specified as in Tol 
(2006a). Simple cost curves are used for the economic impact of abatement, with limited 
scope for endogenous technological progress and interregional spillovers (Tol, 2005). 
The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the effects of climatic 
change.  Population decreases with increasing climate change related deaths that result from 
changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones.  Heat and cold stress are 
assumed to have an effect only on the elderly, non-reproductive population.  In contrast, the 
other sources of mortality also affect the number of births.  Heat stress only affects the urban 
population.  The share of the urban population among the total population is based on the 
World Resources Databases (http://earthtrends.wri.org).  It is extrapolated based on the 
statistical relationship between urbanization and per-capita income, which are estimated from 
a cross-section of countries in 1995.  Climate-induced migration between the regions of the 
world also causes the population sizes to change.  Immigrants are assumed to assimilate 
immediately and completely with the respective host population. 
The tangible welfare impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy.  Consumption and 
investment are reduced without changing the savings rate.  As a result, climate change 
reduces long-term economic growth, although consumption is particularly affected in the 
short-term.  Economic growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide abatement measures.  The 
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energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy supply autonomously 
decrease over time.  This process can be accelerated by abatement policies. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, 
methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the effect of carbon dioxide 
emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the effect of the damages on the 
economy caused by climate change.  Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the 
atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted.  The atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide, measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by the five-box model of 
Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987).  Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992).  
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur aerosols is 
determined based on Shine et al. (1990).  The global mean temperature, T, is governed by a 
geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing, RF), with a half-
life of 50 years.  In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C 
for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents.  Regional temperature is derived by multiplying 
the global mean temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate 
change pattern averaged over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al., 2000).  The global mean sea level 
is also geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 
50 years.  Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess 
temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
The climate welfare impact module, based on Tol (2002a; b) includes the following 
categories: agriculture, forestry, hurricanes, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory 
disorders related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, 
energy consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. Climate change related 
damages are triggered by either the rate of temperature change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or 
the level of temperature change (benchmarked at 1.0°C).  Damages from the rate of 
temperature change slowly fade, reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
In the model individuals can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne 
diseases, or they can migrate because of sea level rise.  Like all welfare impacts of climate 
change, these effects are monetized.  The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the 
annual per capita income.  The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the 
observed range of values in the literature (cf. Cline, 1992).  The value of emigration is set to 
be 3 times the per capita income (Tol, 1995; 1996), the value of immigration is 40 per cent of 
the per capita income in the host region (Cline, 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to 
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sea level rise are modelled explicitly.  The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of 
dryland was on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994).  
Dryland value is assumed to be proportional to GDP per square kilometre.  Wetland losses are 
valued at $2 million per square kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 
1994).  The wetland value is assumed to have logistic relation to per capita income.  Coastal 
protection is based on cost-benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due 
to the construction of dikes and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other welfare impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, hurricanes, energy, water, and 
ecosystems, are directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of 
impacts measured in their ‘natural’ units (cf. Tol, 2002a).  Modelled effects of climate change 
on energy consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly 
recognize that there is a climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, 
including plant physiology and the behaviour of farmers.  Impacts are positive or negative 
depending on whether the actual climate conditions are moving closer to or away from that 
optimum climate.  Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions are further away from the 
optimum climate.  The optimum climate is of importance with regard to the potential impacts.  
The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed of adaptation.  
The impacts of not being fully adapted to new climate conditions are always negative (cf. Tol, 
2002b). 
The welfare impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, hurricanes, unmanaged 
ecosystems, water resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are 
modelled as simple power functions.  Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not 
change sign (cf. Tol, 2002b).  
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and 
technological progress.  Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water 
resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), and 
ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes).  Other systems are projected to 
become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological progress), 
agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-borne diseases (with improved 
health care) (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
In the Monte Carlo analyses, essentially all parameters are varied. The probability density 
functions are mostly based on expert guesses, but where possible “objective” estimates were 
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used. Parameters are assumed to vary independently of one another. Details of the Monte 
Carlo analysis can be found on FUND’s website at http://www.fund-model.org. 
4. Results 
4.1. Scenarios 
Stern et al. (2006) present the impacts of climate change as the change in BGE between a 
baseline scenario with no climate change impacts and various scenarios with climate impacts. 
We present similar results but add more sensitivity analysis. In particular, we present results 
for alternative assumptions on discounting and risk aversion, and include four alternative 
socio-economic scenarios. We refer to these runs as “costless mitigation”. That is, we ran the 
model with a hypothetical policy ω, by which all climate change impacts are completely 
avoided, but none of the costs associated with such complete mitigation are accounted for. 
Comparing the change in the BGE between a run with a do-nothing policy (business as usual 
scenario) and the costless mitigation policy, we obtain a measure of the overall damage of 
climate change. 
While these results are interesting, they are also difficult to interpret. Originally, the concept 
of a change in BGE was proposed to evaluate concrete policy proposals. Since completely 
mitigating all climate change impacts at no cost is impossible, looking at the change in BGE 
between a scenario with no climate change and various climate change scenarios cannot be 
considered as evaluating policy options. We therefore present a second set of results where we 
evaluate specific carbon taxation policies and calculate the change in BGE (or any of the more 
complicated concepts) from a business as usual scenario to a policy choice of some carbon 
taxation. 
For any combination of socio economic scenario, pure rate of time preference, rate of risk 
aversion, uncertainty treatment and social welfare function, we calculated the BGE for two 
policy choices: One business as usual policy with no greenhouse gas taxation and the BGE for 
the optimal policy choice, in terms of the social welfare function employed. The latter is 
characterised as follows: Following Pigou (1947), we assumed that the optimal carbon tax 
should be the same for all agents at any time t, and that it has to increase with the interest rate 
(Hotelling, 1931). Given these constraints, the problem reduces to finding the optimal initial 
greenhouse gas tax level, i.e. the social shadow price of carbon emissions. The optimisations 
run for this paper use a simple search algorithm that finds a solution that is within $0.50 of the 
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true optimal tax value. Given the huge uncertainties of integrated assessment models and 
limited computational resources, this seemed a reasonable compromise. 
In the following sections we point out our key findings both for the costless mitigation runs 
and the optimal policy runs. 
4.2. Costless mitigation – total damage 
Figure 1 shows the benefits of going from a business as usual policy to a costless mitigation 
policy in terms of change of CBGE for various pure rates of time preference, risk aversion 
and socio-economic scenario choices. Figure 1 shows the mean change in BGE over all socio-
economic scenarios, with the minimum and maximum shown on the error bars. The numbers 
in this figure form the model sensitivity analysis to the results of the Stern Review. 
In general, the numbers calculated by FUND tend to suggest lower total damages than the 
figures from the Stern Review, given apparently comparable welfare economic treatment. 
Probably the main driver for this effect is one crucial difference in modeling impacts in the 
model PAGE as used for the Stern Review and FUND: PAGE puts more emphasis on the 
negative impacts of climate change, i.e. it will never produce a net global benefit from an 
increase in temperature for any time step. FUND on the other hand has various sectors in 
which modest temperature increases in some regions can lead to net benefits, so that in 
particular in the earlier time periods impacts of climate change are positive for some regions. 
Furthermore, PAGE assumes that vulnerability to climate change is constant, while FUND 
has that regions grow less vulnerable as they grow richer. Sterner and Persson (2007) and Tol 
and Yohe (2007) show that this is an important assumption. 
At the same time, our results mimic some key features of the Stern Review results: higher time 
preference rates and higher risk aversion always lead to lower impacts estimates. For time 
discounting, this is rather well established in the literature (e.g. Guo et al., 2006; Newell and 
Pizer, 2003). That higher η values lead to lower damages is less straight forward, as it controls 
two effects at the same time. First, the effective discount rate is increased, which certainly 
leads to lower damage estimates. Second, more weight is given to unlikely but bad outcomes, 
i.e. the decision maker is assumed to be more risk averse, which should lead to higher damage 
estimates. The result from Figure 1 show that the first effect strongly dominates the second in 
the kind of uncertainty analysis employed for this paper, i.e. that the increase in the discount 
rate offsets the increase in risk aversion. 
The Stern Review itself pointed out that a global welfare function cannot take into account 
how damages are distributed with respect to high/low income regions, and that a regional 
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disaggregated welfare function would be a more appropriate choice. Figure 2 shows results 
using a social welfare function that is disaggregated into 16 world regions, again with the 
mean (and minimum and maximum) of the socio-economic scenarios for a costless mitigation 
policy. 
There are three key insights: First, using a disaggregated regional social welfare function 
always increases total damage estimates; second, the role of η is reversed; and third, high η 
values lead to estimates that are very large. 
The first result, i.e. higher damages from a regional disaggregated welfare function, is not 
theoretically unambiguous, but nevertheless it is robust over all scenarios analyzed for this 
paper. A disaggregated regional welfare function in general gives higher weights to impacts in 
poor regions than in high income regions. In general (but not in every detail), FUND has more 
negative impacts in poor regions. 
With a regional welfare function, η plays a third role, namely that of inequality aversion, in 
addition to the parameter of risk aversion and substitution of consumption over time. With 
this third role added, the response of the total damage estimates to higher values for η is 
reversed, in particular the inequality and risk aversion aspect dominate the higher discount 
rate aspect of high η values and therefore total damage estimates increase with higher values 
for η. This directly points to one central problem with the kind of welfare function commonly 
employed in climate change analysis (and this paper), namely the over use of η to control 
three issues at the same time (cf. Beckerman and Hepburn, 2007). A number of the critics of 
the Stern Review (e.g., Dasgupta, 2007) have argued that while a low pure rate of time 
preference might be acceptable, one should pick a higher value for η, so that the overall 
discount rate is more in line with market interest rates. In the context of a global welfare 
function as used by Stern et al. (2006) this suggestion makes sense, but with a regional 
welfare function the effect on the estimated damage may be unexpected. 
Finally, we produce very large results for high η values with a regional welfare function. This 
is a direct manifestation of Weitzman’s (2008) fat tail argument: Comparing the regional 
probabilistic results with deterministic runs, and a detailed analysis of the drivers of those 
extreme values shows that some regions approach very low consumption levels in some 
scenarios in our Monte Carlo analysis. With a global welfare function those extreme results in 
a few regions are averaged out, but with a regional welfare function these fat tails in single 
regions drive the analysis. 
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4.3. Optimal mitigation 
While an analysis of the total expected damage of climate change is of interest, a more policy 
relevant question is that of the optimal response and of the maximal achievable improvement 
over a business as usual policy. 
Table 1 compares the total damage with the maximum improvement possible via mitigation 
for SRES scenario A2 for a probabilistic analysis. The A2 scenario is the scenario of choice in 
the Stern Review. For a global welfare function as used by the Stern Review, the best possible 
improvement is always significantly lower than the total damage estimate. Except for runs 
with high η values, this conclusion also holds for a regional welfare function. The runs with 
η=2 have to be interpreted with care, since the manifestation of fat-tails showing up there 
might make the framework used to look for the optimal policy response less appropriate. 
A global welfare function underestimates by a large margin the improvements that can be 
obtained by an optimal policy choice. Table 2 compares the optimal carbon tax levels in the 
year 2000 for the A2 scenario. While the optimal initial tax is higher for a regional welfare 
function, the change in the BGE for a regional welfare function is much larger for the optimal 
policy than the change in the tax level. The prime reason for this is that the introduction of a 
regional welfare function not only gives more weight to damages in low income regions, but 
mitigation costs in poor regions also get a higher weight, thereby balancing the effect of the 
regional welfare function somewhat. 
Table 3 highlights the importance of distributional issues and uncertainty in climate change. 
Table 3 shows our estimate of the total impacts of climate change using a global welfare 
function ignoring uncertainty and compares this to the regional welfare function. In the global 
welfare function, global average impacts are computed before being converted to utility. In 
the regional welfare function, regional average impacts are converted to utility and then 
averaged for the world. Irrespective of the rates of pure time preference or risk aversion, the 
regional welfare function implies impacts that are substantially higher. This is well-known in 
the literature (Azar and Sterner, 1996; Fankhauser et al., 1997; 1998; Azar, 1999). It is 
remarkable that the Stern Review overlooked this. With uncertainty, the difference between a 
global and a regional welfare function is even stronger. 
Qualitatively, the results for the A2 scenario hold for the other scenarios as well. See the 
Appendix for detailed results. Quantitatively, the results are different, of course, and where 
the relationship is ambiguous (e.g., between η and ∆γ), different scenarios may show different 
signs. Table 4 shows the total impact of climate change for five alternative socio-economic 
 15
and emissions scenarios. The A2 scenario is generally in the middle of the range. Hotter 
(FUND) and poorer (B2) scenarios show higher impacts, while cooler (B1) and richer (A1b) 
scenarios show lower impacts. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper defines various balanced growth equivalences, and applies them to compute the 
impacts of climate change and the benefits of emission reduction with the integrated 
assessment model FUND. We conduct a wider sensitivity analysis than run by the Stern 
Review. We find that the impacts of climate change are sensitive to the pure rate of time 
preference, the rate of risk aversion, the level of spatial disaggregation, the inclusion of 
uncertainty, and the socio-economic scenario. Our results span a wider range in both 
directions compared to the Stern Review, thereby questioning the assertion that the high 
results obtained by the Stern Review are robust. We find that the guess of the Stern Review 
that a regional welfare function might increase overall damage estimates by a quarter (Stern et 
al., 2006, p. 187) is very conservative. In our runs, the introduction of a regional welfare 
function, in particular in combination with a high risk aversion, has a much larger effect on 
the results. Finally, we show that the Stern Review was wrong to equate the impact of climate 
change and the benefits of emission reduction. Qualitatively, this was known. Quantitatively, 
we show that this is a big mistake. 
The results also show areas that need more research work. This includes improved socio-
economic and climate scenarios, and better and more complete estimates of the impacts of 
climate change. In particular, disentangling intertemporal substitution from risk aversion and 
inequality aversion is a high priority (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2005). With only one parameter to 
control three important effects, as commonly used in climate policy analysis, model- and 
scenario-specific ambiguities emerge. The fat tails that showed up in some of our results with 
high risk aversion and a regional welfare function are another area for further research. 
Acknowledgements 
We had extensive discussions about the Stern Review with many people, notable Simon 
Dietz, Cameron Hepburn, Nick Stern, and Gary Yohe. Funding by the International Max 
Planck Research School on Earth System Modelling and the ESRI Energy Policy Research 
Centre is gratefully acknowledged. All errors and opinions are ours. 
 16
References 
 
Arrow, K., 2007. Global Climate Change: A Challenge to Policy. The Economists' Voice. 
Atkinson, A.B., 1970. On the Measurement of Inequality. Journal of Economic Theory, 2: 
244-263. 
Azar, C., 1999. Weight factors in cost-benefit analysis of climate change. Environmental and 
Resource Economics, 13: 249-268. 
Azar, C. and Sterner, T., 1996. Discounting and Distributional Considerations in the Context 
of Global Warming. Ecological Economics, 19(2): 169–84. 
Batjes, J.J. and Goldewijk, C.G.M., 1994. The IMAGE 2 Hundred Year (1890-1990) 
Database of the Global Environment (HYDE). RIVM, Bilthoven, 410100082. 
Beckerman, W. and Hepburn, C., 2007. Ethics of the Discount Rate in the Stern Review on 
the Economics of Climate Change. World Economics, 8(1): 187-210. 
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W. and Donaldson, D., 1995. Intertemporal Population Ethics: 
Critical-Level Utilitarian Principles. Econometrica, 63(6): 1303-1320. 
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D., 1984. Social Criteria for Evaluating Population Change. 
Journal of Public Economics, 25: 13-33. 
Carlsson, F., Daruvala, D. and Johansson-Stenman, O., 2005. Are People Inequality-Averse, 
or Just Risk-Averse? Economica, 72(3): 375-396. 
Cline, W.R., 1992. The Economics of Global Warming. Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC. 
Dasgupta, P., 2007. Commentary: The Stern Review’s Economics of Climate Change. 
National Institute Economic Review, 199: 4-7. 
Fankhauser, S., 1994. Protection vs. Retreat -- The Economic Costs of Sea Level Rise. 
Environment and Planning A, 27: 299-319. 
Fankhauser, S., Tol, R.S.J. and Pearce, D.W., 1997. The Aggregation of Climate Change 
Damages: A Welfare Theoretic Approach. Environmental and Resource Economics, 
10(3): 249–66. 
Fankhauser, S., Tol, R.S.J. and Pearce, D.W., 1998. Extensions and alternatives to climate 
change impact valuation: on the critique of IPCC Working Group III’s impact 
estimates. Environment and Development Economics, 3: 59-81. 
Guo, J., Hepburn, C.J., Tol, R.S.J. and Anthoff, D., 2006. Discounting and the social cost of 
carbon: a closer look at uncertainty. Environmental Science & Policy, 9(3): 205-216. 
 17
Hammitt, J.K., Lempert, R.J. and Schlesinger, M.E., 1992. A Sequential-Decision Strategy for 
Abating Climate Change. Nature, 357: 315-318. 
Hotelling, H., 1931. The Economics of Exhaustible Resources. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 39(2): 137-175. 
Kattenberg, A., Giorgi, F., Grassl, H., Meehl, G.A., Mitchell, J.F.B., Stouffer, R.J., Tokioka, 
T., Weaver, A.J. and Wigley, T.M.L., 1996. Climate Models - Projections of Future 
Climate. In J.T. Houghton, L.G. Meiro Filho, B.A. Callander, N. Harris, A. Kattenberg 
and K. Maskell (Eds.), Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change -- 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge  
Leggett, J., Pepper, W.J. and Swart, R.J., 1992. Emissions scenarios for the IPCC: an update. 
In J.T. Houghton, B.A. Callander and S.K. Varney (Eds.), Climate Change 1992 - The 
Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Link, P.M. and Tol, R.S.J., 2004. Possible economic impacts of a shutdown of the 
thermohaline circulation:  An application of FUND. Portuguese Economic Journal, 3: 
99-114. 
Maier-Reimer, E. and Hasselmann, K., 1987. Transport and Storage of Carbon Dioxide in the 
Ocean: An Inorganic Ocean Circulation Carbon Cycle Model. Climate Dynamics, 2: 
63-90. 
Mendelsohn, R.O., 2006. A Critique of the Stern Report. Regulation. 
Mendelsohn, R.O., Schlesinger, M.E. and Williams, L.J., 2000. Comparing Impacts across 
Climate Models. Integrated Assessment, 1: 37-48. 
Mirrlees, J.A. and Stern, N., 1972. Fairly Good Plans. Journal of Economic Theory, 4(2): 
268-288. 
Newell, R.G. and Pizer, W.A., 2003. Discounting the distant future: how much do uncertain 
rates increase valuations? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
46(1): 52-71. 
Nordhaus, W., 2007a. Critical Assumptions in the Stern Review on Climate Change. Science, 
317: 201-202. 
Nordhaus, W.D., 2007b. A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 45(3): 686–702. 
Pearce, D.W., Cline, W.R., Achanta, A.N., Fankhauser, S., Pachauri, R.K., Tol, R.S.J. and 
Vellinga, P., 1996. The Social Costs of Climate Change: Greenhouse Damage and the 
 18
Benefits of Control. In J.P.Bruce, H.Lee and E.F.Haites (Eds.), Climate Change 1995: 
Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change -- Contribution of Working 
Group III to the Second Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Pielke Jr, R., 2007. Mistreatment of the economic impacts of extreme events in the Stern 
Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change. Global Environmental Change. 
Pigou, A.C., 1947. A Study in Public Finance. Macmillan. 
Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J.E., 1970. Increasing Risk: I. A Definition. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 2: 225-243. 
Shine, K.P., Derwent, R.G., Wuebbles, D.J. and Morcrette, J.J., 1990. Radiative Forcing of 
Climate. In J.T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins and J.J. Ephraums (Eds.), Climate Change - 
The IPCC Scientific Assessment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge  
Smith, J.B., Schellnhuber, H.J., Mirza, M.Q., Fankhauser, S., Leemans, R., Erda, L., Ogallo, 
L., Pittock, B., Richels, R.G., Rosenzweig, C., Safriel, U., Tol, R.S.J., Weyant, J.P., 
Yohe, G.W., Mccarthy, J.J., Canziani, O.F., Leary, N.A., Dokken, D.J. and White, 
K.S., 2001. Vulnerability to Climate Change and Reasons for Concern: A Synthesis. 
Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Press Syndicate of the 
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK. 
Stern, N., Peters, S., Bakhshi, V., Bowen, A., Cameron, C., Catovsky, S., Crane, D., 
Cruickshank, S., Dietz, S., Edmonson, N., Garbett, S.-L., Hamid, L., Hoffman, G., 
Ingram, D., Jones, B., Patmore, N., Radcliffe, H., Sathiyarajah, R., Stock, M., Taylor, 
C., Vernon, T., Wanjie, H. and Zenghelis, D., 2006. The Economics of Climate 
Change. The Stern Review. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Sterner, T. and Persson, U.M., 2007. An Even Sterner Review. Introducing Relative Prices 
into the Discounting Debate. Resources for the Future Discussion Paper. 
Tol, R.S.J., 1995. The Damage Costs of Climate Change -- Towards More Comprehensive 
Calculations. Environmental and Resource Economics, 5: 353-374. 
Tol, R.S.J., 1996. The Damage Costs of Climate Change: Towards a Dynamic Representation. 
Ecological Economics, 19: 67-90. 
Tol, R.S.J., 2002a. Estimates of the damage costs of climate change. Part 1: Benchmark 
estimates. Environmental and Resource Economics, 21(2): 47-73. 
Tol, R.S.J., 2002b. Estimates of the damage costs of climate change. Part 2: Dynamic 
estimates. Environmental and Resource Economics, 21(2): 135-160. 
 19
Tol, R.S.J., 2005. An Emission Intensity Protocol for Climate Change: An Application of 
FUND. Climate Policy, 4: 269-287. 
Tol, R.S.J., 2006a. Multi-Gas Emission Reduction for Climate Change Policy: An 
Application of FUND. Energy Journal, (Multi-Greenhouse Gas Mitigation and 
Climate Policy Special Issue): 235-250. 
Tol, R.S.J., 2006b. The Stern review of the economics of climate change: a comment. 
Tol, R.S.J. and Yohe, G.W., 2007. The Stern Review: A deconstruction. FNU Working Paper 
125. Available at http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/working-
papers/sterngecwp.pdf [accessed on 5 April 2007]. 
Weitzman, M.L., 2007. A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 45(3): 703–724. 
Weitzman, M.L., 2008. On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate 
Change. Available at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/weitzman/files/modeling.pdf [accessed on 
6 March 2008]. 
Yohe, G.W. and Tol, R.S.J., 2007. Precaution and a Dismal Theorem: Implications for 
Climate Policy and Climate Research. FNU Working Papers 145, FNU, University of 
Hamburg, Germany, Hamburg, Germany. 
Yohe, G.W., Tol, R.S.J. and Murphy, D., 2007. On Setting Near-Term Climate Policy as the 
Dust Begins to Settle: The Legacy of the Stern Review. Energy and Environment, 
18(5). 
 
 
 20
Figures 
 
-1,0%
0,0%
1,0%
2,0%
3,0%
4,0%
5,0%
η=1 η=1.5 η=2
∆γ
C
ρ=0.1%
ρ=1%
ρ=3%
 
Figure 1: Costless mitigation with a global welfare function 
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Figure 2: Costless mitigation with a regional welfare function 
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 Tables 
 
 η=1.0 η=1.5 η=2.0 
Global welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 1.35% (3.38%) 0.85% (2.46%) 0.40% (1.52%) 
ρ=1.0% 0.40% (1.57%) 0.19% (0.93%) 0.08% (0.46%) 
ρ=3.0% 0.01% (0.03%) 0.02% (-0.07%) 0.01% (-0.14%) 
Regional welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 4.46% (10.18%) 38.62% (48.38%) 1019.24% (1100.72%)
ρ=1.0% 1.54% (5.39%) 10.79% (16.21%) 239.87% (258.57%) 
ρ=3.0% 0.08% (1.59%) 0.61% (3.41%) 11.42% (15.91%) 
Table 1: Change in CBGE and CEBGE for optimal (costless in brackets) mitigation policy for SRES 
scenario A2  
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  η=1.0 η=1.5 η=2.0 
Global welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 40.63 23.75 11.88 
ρ=1.0% 15.63 6.88 3.13 
ρ=3.0% 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Regional welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 51.25 54.38 50.63 
ρ=1.0% 21.25 25.63 31.25 
ρ=3.0% 2.50 6.88 7.50 
Table 2: Optimal initial tax ($/tC) for SRES A2 scenario under a probabilistic analysis 
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  η=1.0 η=1.5 η=2.0 
Global welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 1.56% 0.59% -
0.15% 
ρ=1.0% 0.07% -
0.46% 
-
0.75% 
ρ=3.0% -
0.91% 
-
0.94% 
-
0.95% 
Regional welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 3.15% 2.74% 2.54% 
ρ=1.0% 1.07% 1.22% 1.75% 
ρ=3.0% -
0.51% 
0.40% 1.44% 
Table 3: Change in BGE and EBGE for costless mitigation policy for SRES scenario A2 without 
uncertainty 
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  η=1.0   η=1.5   η=2.0   
 ρ=0.1
% 
ρ=1.0
% 
ρ=3.0
% 
ρ=0.1
% 
ρ=1.0
% 
ρ=3.0
% 
ρ=0.1
% 
ρ=1.0
% 
ρ=3.0
% 
Global welfare function 
FUN
D 
4.72% 2.30% 0.23% 3.58% 1.47% 0.06% 2.29% 0.80% -0.05% 
A1b 1.51% 0.50% -0.20% 0.56% 0.02% -0.28% -0.01% -0.21% -0.32% 
A2 3.38% 1.57% 0.03% 2.46% 0.93% -0.07% 1.52% 0.46% -0.14% 
B1 0.09% -0.16% -0.32% -0.13% -0.26% -0.33% -0.25% -0.30% -0.33% 
B2 3.54% 1.59% -0.01% 2.65% 0.98% -0.11% 1.69% 0.50% -0.19% 
Regional welfare function 
FUN
D 
12.74
% 
6.89% 1.93% 59.38
% 
22.37
% 
4.32% 1277% 368.7
% 
31.93
% 
A1b 5.07% 2.61% 0.95% 17.46
% 
5.68% 2.01% 407.1
% 
80.80
% 
6.07% 
A2 10.18
% 
5.39% 1.59% 48.38
% 
16.21
% 
3.41% 1100% 258.5
% 
15.91
% 
B1 1.96% 1.23% 0.70% 2.45% 2.02% 1.80% 3.54% 3.14% 3.09% 
B2 9.11% 4.67% 1.42% 34.41
% 
12.39
% 
3.13% 788.5
% 
192.6
% 
13.63
% 
Table 4: Costless mitigation for probabilistic runs by socio economic scenario 
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Appendix – Complete results 
Global probabilistic welfare function 
 η   
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% 4.72% 3.58% 2.29% 
1.0% 2.30% 1.47% 0.80% 
3.0% 0.23% 0.06% -0.05% 
SRES A1b    
0.1% 1.51% 0.56% -0.01% 
1.0% 0.50% 0.02% -0.21% 
3.0% -0.20% -0.28% -0.32% 
SRES A2    
0.1% 3.38% 2.46% 1.52% 
1.0% 1.57% 0.93% 0.46% 
3.0% 0.03% -0.07% -0.14% 
SRES B1    
0.1% 0.09% -0.13% -0.25% 
1.0% -0.16% -0.26% -0.30% 
3.0% -0.32% -0.33% -0.33% 
SRES B2    
0.1% 3.54% 2.65% 1.69% 
1.0% 1.59% 0.98% 0.50% 
3.0% -0.01% -0.11% -0.19% 
Table 5: ∆γC between a BAU scenario and a costless, full mitigation scenario for various socio 
economic scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and marginal elasticity of consumption 
values (η) 
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  η   
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% 2.22% 1.55% 0.87% 
1.0% 0.77% 0.44% 0.21% 
3.0% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 
SRES A1b    
0.1% 0.33% 0.09% 0.02% 
1.0% 0.05% 0.03% 0.01% 
3.0% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
SRES A2    
0.1% 1.35% 0.85% 0.40% 
1.0% 0.40% 0.19% 0.08% 
3.0% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 
SRES B1    
0.1% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 
1.0% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 
3.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SRES B2    
0.1% 1.35% 0.92% 0.47% 
1.0% 0.38% 0.21% 0.10% 
3.0% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 
Table 6: ∆γC between a BAU scenario and the optimal mitigation strategy for various socio economic 
scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and marginal elasticity of consumption values (η) 
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  η   
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% $43.13 $26.88 $15.00 
1.0% $20.00 $10.63 $5.00 
3.0% $1.25 $0.63 $0.63 
SRES A1b    
0.1% $16.88 $2.50 $0.63 
1.0% $3.75 $0.63 $0.63 
3.0% $0.63 $0.63 $0.63 
SRES A2    
0.1% $40.63 $23.75 $11.88 
1.0% $15.63 $6.88 $3.13 
3.0% $0.63 $0.63 $0.63 
SRES B1    
0.1% $7.50 $2.50 $0.63 
1.0% $2.50 $0.63 $0.63 
3.0% $0.63 $0.00 $0.00 
SRES B2    
0.1% $41.88 $25.00 $13.13 
1.0% $16.88 $8.13 $3.75 
3.0% $0.63 $0.63 $0.63 
Table 7: Optimal global tax per ton of carbon emission in the year 2000 
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  η   
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1%    
Expected temp in 2050 1.97° 1.99° 2.00° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.08° 3.17° 3.27° 
Max. expected temp 4.72° 4.71° 4.77° 
1.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.00° 2.01° 2.02° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.26° 3.35° 3.43° 
Max. expected temp 4.89° 4.97° 5.12° 
3.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.03° 2.03° 2.03° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.53° 3.54° 3.53° 
Max. expected temp 5.83° 5.79° 5.30° 
SRES A1b    
0.1%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.10° 2.13° 2.13° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.42° 3.54° 3.57° 
Max. expected temp 5.79° 6.22° 6.05° 
1.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.13° 2.13° 2.13° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.53° 3.57° 3.56° 
Max. expected temp 6.15° 6.22° 5.48° 
3.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.13° 2.13° 2.13° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.56° 3.55° 3.50° 
Max. expected temp 5.70° 5.20° 4.84° 
SRES A2    
0.1%    
Expected temp in 2050 1.96° 1.98° 1.99° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.08° 3.17° 3.25° 
Max. expected temp 5.47° 5.49° 5.59° 
1.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 1.99° 2.00° 2.01° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.23° 3.30° 3.33° 
Max. expected temp 5.63° 5.80° 5.86° 
3.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.01° 2.01° 2.01° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.37° 3.36° 3.36° 
Max. expected temp 6.25° 5.76° 5.34° 
SRES B1    
0.1%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.04° 2.05° 2.05° 
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Expected temp in 2100 3.10° 3.12° 3.13° 
Max. expected temp 4.59° 4.59° 4.59° 
1.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.05° 2.05° 2.05° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.12° 3.13° 3.13° 
Max. expected temp 4.59° 4.59° 4.35° 
3.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.05° 2.06° 2.06° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.13° 3.15° 3.15° 
Max. expected temp 4.34° 4.76° 4.76° 
SRES B2    
0.1%    
Expected temp in 2050 1.98° 2.00° 2.02° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.03° 3.11° 3.20° 
Max. expected temp 4.89° 4.87° 4.91° 
1.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.01° 2.03° 2.04° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.19° 3.26° 3.30° 
Max. expected temp 5.04° 5.11° 5.17° 
3.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.05° 2.04° 2.04° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.35° 3.34° 3.34° 
Max. expected temp 5.70° 5.28° 4.93° 
Table 8: Expected temperature changes relative to 1990 for the optimal mitigation strategy for a global 
welfare function for various socio economic scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and 
marginal elasticity of consumption values (η) for the year 2050 and 2100 and the maximum expected 
temperature change for the whole simulation period 2000-2300 
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  η   
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1%    
Expected RF in 2050 4.82 4.93 5.04 
Expected RF in 2100 6.11 6.33 6.64 
Max. expected RF 6.73 6.73 6.89 
1.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.00 5.09 5.16 
Expected RF in 2100 6.67 6.98 7.30 
Max. expected RF 7.07 7.28 7.61 
3.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.22 5.24 5.23 
Expected RF in 2100 7.86 7.90 7.74 
Max. expected RF 8.84 8.83 8.17 
SRES A1b    
0.1%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.45 5.61 5.64 
Expected RF in 2100 6.83 7.23 7.30 
Max. expected RF 8.36 8.89 8.56 
1.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.60 5.64 5.63 
Expected RF in 2100 7.20 7.31 7.24 
Max. expected RF 8.74 8.82 7.88 
3.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.64 5.63 5.62 
Expected RF in 2100 7.29 7.17 6.89 
Max. expected RF 8.17 7.58 7.15 
SRES A2    
0.1%    
Expected RF in 2050 4.76 4.87 4.96 
Expected RF in 2100 6.18 6.50 6.80 
Max. expected RF 7.94 7.82 7.88 
1.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 4.93 5.00 5.04 
Expected RF in 2100 6.74 7.00 7.13 
Max. expected RF 7.96 8.23 8.40 
3.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.07 5.07 5.07 
Expected RF in 2100 7.27 7.25 7.19 
Max. expected RF 9.14 8.50 7.95 
SRES B1    
0.1%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.09 5.13 5.15 
 32
Expected RF in 2100 5.78 5.84 5.88 
Max. expected RF 6.57 6.55 6.52 
1.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.13 5.15 5.15 
Expected RF in 2100 5.85 5.88 5.87 
Max. expected RF 6.53 6.49 6.18 
3.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.15 5.17 5.17 
Expected RF in 2100 5.87 5.93 5.93 
Max. expected RF 6.17 6.84 6.84 
SRES B2    
0.1%    
Expected RF in 2050 4.83 4.94 5.04 
Expected RF in 2100 5.85 6.09 6.35 
Max. expected RF 7.01 6.89 6.92 
1.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.02 5.10 5.15 
Expected RF in 2100 6.39 6.61 6.75 
Max. expected RF 7.10 7.26 7.45 
3.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.19 5.19 5.19 
Expected RF in 2100 6.97 6.94 6.88 
Max. expected RF 8.33 7.82 7.37 
Table 9: Expected radiative forcing for the optimal mitigation strategy for a global welfare function for 
various socio economic scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and marginal elasticity of 
consumption values (η) for the year 2050 and 2100 and the maximum expected radiative forcing for 
the whole simulation period 2000-2300 
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Global deterministic welfare function 
 η 
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% 2.35% 1.15% 0.21% 
1.0% 0.56% -0.12% -0.51% 
3.0% -0.70% -0.77% -0.80% 
SRES A1b    
0.1% -0.20% -0.75% -0.95% 
1.0% -0.74% -0.95% -0.99% 
3.0% -1.00% -0.99% -0.95% 
SRES A2    
0.1% 1.56% 0.59% -0.15% 
1.0% 0.07% -0.46% -0.75% 
3.0% -0.91% -0.94% -0.95% 
SRES B1    
0.1% -0.91% -1.03% -1.04% 
1.0% -1.06% -1.06% -1.02% 
3.0% -1.04% -0.99% -0.94% 
SRES B2    
0.1% 1.50% 0.55% -0.17% 
1.0% -0.01% -0.50% -0.78% 
3.0% -0.96% -0.99% -0.99% 
Table 10: ∆γ between a BAU scenario and a costless, full mitigation scenario for various socio 
economic scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and marginal elasticity of consumption 
values (η) 
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  η 
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% 1.82% 0.93% 0.36% 
1.0% 0.57% 0.21% 0.07% 
3.0% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 
SRES A1b    
0.1% 0.14% 0.02% 0.00% 
1.0% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 
3.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SRES A2    
0.1% 1.19% 0.57% 0.20% 
1.0% 0.30% 0.09% 0.02% 
3.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SRES B1    
0.1% 0.03% 0.01% 0.00% 
1.0% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
3.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SRES B2    
0.1% 1.15% 0.56% 0.21% 
1.0% 0.28% 0.09% 0.03% 
3.0% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
Table 11: ∆γ between a BAU scenario and the optimal mitigation strategy for various socio economic 
scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and marginal elasticity of consumption values (η) 
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  η 
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% $41.25 $20.63 $8.75 
1.0% $16.88 $6.25 $1.88 
3.0% $0.63 $0.63 $0.00 
SRES A1b    
0.1% $10.63 $1.25 $0.00 
1.0% $2.50 $0.00 $0.00 
3.0% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
SRES A2    
0.1% $41.25 $21.88 $8.75 
1.0% $14.38 $5.00 $1.25 
3.0% $0.63 $0.00 $0.00 
SRES B1    
0.1% $6.88 $2.50 $0.63 
1.0% $2.50 $0.63 $0.00 
3.0% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
SRES B2    
0.1% $40.63 $21.88 $8.75 
1.0% $14.38 $5.00 $1.25 
3.0% $0.63 $0.00 $0.00 
Table 12: Optimal global tax per ton of carbon emission in the year 2000 
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 Regional probabilistic Welfare Function 
 
 η   
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% 12.74% 59.38% 1277.47% 
1.0% 6.89% 22.37% 368.71% 
3.0% 1.93% 4.32% 31.93% 
SRES A1b    
0.1% 5.07% 17.46% 407.12% 
1.0% 2.61% 5.68% 80.80% 
3.0% 0.95% 2.01% 6.07% 
SRES A2    
0.1% 10.18% 48.38% 1100.72% 
1.0% 5.39% 16.21% 258.57% 
3.0% 1.59% 3.41% 15.91% 
SRES B1    
0.1% 1.96% 2.45% 3.54% 
1.0% 1.23% 2.02% 3.14% 
3.0% 0.70% 1.80% 3.09% 
SRES B2    
0.1% 9.11% 34.41% 788.49% 
1.0% 4.67% 12.39% 192.59% 
3.0% 1.42% 3.13% 13.63% 
Table 13: ∆γCE between a BAU scenario and a costless, full mitigation scenario for various socio 
economic scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and marginal elasticity of consumption 
values (η) 
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  η   
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% 6.47% 49.74% 1198.46% 
1.0% 2.70% 17.10% 347.00% 
3.0% 0.23% 1.56% 27.06% 
SRES A1b    
0.1% 1.07% 13.04% 389.04% 
1.0% 0.25% 2.98% 75.09% 
3.0% 0.01% 0.11% 2.91% 
SRES A2    
0.1% 4.46% 38.62% 1019.24% 
1.0% 1.54% 10.79% 239.87% 
3.0% 0.08% 0.61% 11.42% 
SRES B1    
0.1% 0.11% 0.11% 0.40% 
1.0% 0.04% 0.04% 0.09% 
3.0% 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% 
SRES B2    
0.1% 3.94% 27.02% 738.24% 
1.0% 1.28% 7.97% 179.19% 
3.0% 0.07% 0.48% 9.15% 
Table 14: ∆γCE between a BAU scenario and the optimal mitigation strategy for various socio 
economic scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and marginal elasticity of consumption 
values (η) 
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  η   
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% $49.38 $50.00 $43.13 
1.0% $24.38 $26.25 $25.63 
3.0% $3.75 $5.63 $6.88 
SRES A1b    
0.1% $26.25 $20.00 $9.38 
1.0% $8.13 $9.38 $6.25 
3.0% $1.25 $2.50 $2.50 
SRES A2    
0.1% $51.25 $54.38 $50.63 
1.0% $21.25 $25.63 $31.25 
3.0% $2.50 $6.88 $7.50 
SRES B1    
0.1% $10.63 $4.38 $2.50 
1.0% $5.00 $2.50 $1.25 
3.0% $0.63 $1.25 $1.25 
SRES B2    
0.1% $46.25 $40.00 $33.75 
1.0% $21.88 $21.25 $18.75 
3.0% $2.50 $4.38 $4.38 
Table 15: Optimal global tax per ton of carbon emission in the year 2000 
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  η   
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1%    
Expected temp in 2050 1.96° 1.94° 1.94° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.01° 2.87° 2.83° 
Max. expected temp 4.55° 4.03° 3.72° 
1.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 1.99° 1.98° 1.97° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.18° 3.02° 2.91° 
Max. expected temp 4.66° 4.05° 3.69° 
3.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.03° 2.02° 2.01° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.43° 3.26° 3.09° 
Max. expected temp 4.94° 4.20° 3.80° 
SRES A1b    
0.1%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.08° 2.08° 2.11° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.31° 3.23° 3.30° 
Max. expected temp 5.31° 4.58° 4.53° 
1.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.12° 2.11° 2.11° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.48° 3.35° 3.30° 
Max. expected temp 5.57° 4.69° 4.47° 
3.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.13° 2.13° 2.12° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.55° 3.43° 3.30° 
Max. expected temp 5.42° 4.70° 4.40° 
SRES A2    
0.1%    
Expected temp in 2050 1.94° 1.93° 1.93° 
Expected temp in 2100 2.98° 2.85° 2.80° 
Max. expected temp 5.12° 4.44° 3.98° 
1.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 1.98° 1.97° 1.95° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.17° 3.04° 2.88° 
Max. expected temp 5.24° 4.40° 3.86° 
3.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.01° 1.99° 1.99° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.33° 3.16° 3.07° 
Max. expected temp 5.31° 4.26° 3.99° 
SRES B1    
0.1%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.04° 2.05° 2.05° 
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Expected temp in 2100 3.08° 3.10° 3.11° 
Max. expected temp 4.53° 4.50° 4.32° 
1.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.05° 2.05° 2.05° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.10° 3.11° 3.12° 
Max. expected temp 4.48° 4.34° 4.23° 
3.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.05° 2.05° 2.05° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.13° 3.11° 3.09° 
Max. expected temp 4.34° 4.06° 3.91° 
SRES B2    
0.1%    
Expected temp in 2050 1.97° 1.97° 1.98° 
Expected temp in 2100 2.99° 2.94° 2.90° 
Max. expected temp 4.76° 4.34° 3.96° 
1.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.01° 2.00° 2.00° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.14° 3.06° 3.00° 
Max. expected temp 4.75° 4.20° 3.91° 
3.0%    
Expected temp in 2050 2.04° 2.03° 2.03° 
Expected temp in 2100 3.31° 3.22° 3.15° 
Max. expected temp 4.91° 4.24° 3.98° 
Table 16: Expected temperature changes relative to 1990 for the optimal mitigation strategy for a 
regional welfare function for various socio economic scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) 
and marginal elasticity of consumption values (η) for the year 2050 and 2100 and the maximum 
expected temperature change for the whole simulation period 2000-2300 
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  η   
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1%    
Expected RF in 2050 4.76 4.61 4.59 
Expected RF in 2100 5.88 5.39 5.16 
Max. expected RF 6.48 5.72 5.34 
1.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 4.95 4.85 4.77 
Expected RF in 2100 6.36 5.71 5.29 
Max. expected RF 6.70 5.85 5.41 
3.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.17 5.11 5.04 
Expected RF in 2100 7.27 6.33 5.64 
Max. expected RF 7.47 6.37 5.78 
SRES A1b    
0.1%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.34 5.31 5.44 
Expected RF in 2100 6.47 6.09 6.18 
Max. expected RF 7.64 6.64 6.65 
1.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.53 5.47 5.47 
Expected RF in 2100 6.99 6.44 6.12 
Max. expected RF 7.89 6.85 6.61 
3.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.62 5.57 5.53 
Expected RF in 2100 7.21 6.61 5.95 
Max. expected RF 7.82 6.94 6.57 
SRES A2    
0.1%    
Expected RF in 2050 4.69 4.57 4.53 
Expected RF in 2100 5.82 5.37 5.16 
Max. expected RF 7.45 6.32 5.69 
1.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 4.88 4.81 4.67 
Expected RF in 2100 6.47 5.86 5.26 
Max. expected RF 7.39 6.28 5.64 
3.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.04 4.96 4.93 
Expected RF in 2100 7.07 6.16 5.72 
Max. expected RF 7.79 6.32 5.96 
SRES B1    
0.1%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.06 5.11 5.12 
 42
Expected RF in 2100 5.74 5.80 5.80 
Max. expected RF 6.49 6.40 6.13 
1.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.10 5.12 5.13 
Expected RF in 2100 5.80 5.82 5.82 
Max. expected RF 6.34 6.15 6.06 
3.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.15 5.13 5.12 
Expected RF in 2100 5.87 5.77 5.65 
Max. expected RF 6.17 5.93 5.81 
SRES B2    
0.1%    
Expected RF in 2050 4.79 4.76 4.75 
Expected RF in 2100 5.70 5.49 5.32 
Max. expected RF 6.83 6.14 5.64 
1.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 4.96 4.93 4.90 
Expected RF in 2100 6.16 5.79 5.54 
Max. expected RF 6.69 6.02 5.71 
3.0%    
Expected RF in 2050 5.16 5.11 5.10 
Expected RF in 2100 6.78 6.29 5.93 
Max. expected RF 7.26 6.35 6.02 
Table 17: Expected radiative forcing for the optimal mitigation strategy for a regional welfare function 
for various socio economic scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and marginal elasticity of 
consumption values (η) for the year 2050 and 2100 and the maximum expected radiative forcing for 
the whole simulation period 2000-2300 
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 Regional deterministic welfare function 
 
 η 
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% 3.81% 2.81% 2.23% 
1.0% 1.53% 1.29% 1.62% 
3.0% -0.33% 0.45% 1.39% 
SRES A1b    
0.1% 1.09% 0.88% 1.22% 
1.0% 0.15% 0.42% 1.14% 
3.0% -0.54% 0.20% 1.16% 
SRES A2    
0.1% 3.15% 2.74% 2.54% 
1.0% 1.07% 1.22% 1.75% 
3.0% -0.51% 0.40% 1.44% 
SRES B1    
0.1% 0.05% 0.37% 1.06% 
1.0% -0.38% 0.20% 1.06% 
3.0% -0.69% 0.14% 1.14% 
SRES B2    
0.1% 2.67% 2.30% 2.32% 
1.0% 0.86% 1.09% 1.81% 
3.0% -0.44% 0.52% 1.70% 
Table 18: ∆γE between a BAU scenario and a costless, full mitigation scenario for various socio 
economic scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and marginal elasticity of consumption 
values (η) 
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  η 
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% 1.56% 0.65% 0.20% 
1.0% 0.48% 0.14% 0.04% 
3.0% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 
SRES A1b    
0.1% 0.13% 0.02% 0.00% 
1.0% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 
3.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SRES A2    
0.1% 1.28% 0.57% 0.19% 
1.0% 0.31% 0.09% 0.03% 
3.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SRES B1    
0.1% 0.03% 0.01% 0.00% 
1.0% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
3.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SRES B2    
0.1% 1.04% 0.44% 0.14% 
1.0% 0.24% 0.07% 0.02% 
3.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Table 19: ∆γE between a BAU scenario and the optimal mitigation strategy for various socio economic 
scenarios, pure rate of time preference values (ρ) and marginal elasticity of consumption values (η) 
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  η 
ρ 1.0 1.5 2.0 
FUND    
0.1% $32.50 $15.00 $6.25 
1.0% $13.13 $4.38 $1.88 
3.0% $0.63 $0.63 $0.00 
SRES A1b    
0.1% $7.50 $1.25 $0.00 
1.0% $1.25 $0.00 $0.00 
3.0% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
SRES A2    
0.1% $33.13 $15.63 $5.63 
1.0% $11.25 $3.13 $1.25 
3.0% $0.63 $0.00 $0.00 
SRES B1    
0.1% $6.25 $2.50 $0.63 
1.0% $2.50 $0.63 $0.63 
3.0% $0.63 $0.00 $0.00 
SRES B2    
0.1% $33.13 $15.00 $5.63 
1.0% $10.63 $3.13 $1.25 
3.0% $0.63 $0.00 $0.00 
Table 20: Optimal global tax per ton of carbon emission in the year 2000 
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Year Number 
Title/Author(s) 
ESRI Authors/Co-authors Italicised 
   
2008 227 Changing Returns to Education During a Boom? 
The Case of Ireland 
  Seamus McGuinness, Frances McGinnity, Philip 
O’Connell 
   
 226 ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Social Risks: Life Cycle and Social 
Class Perspectives on Social Exclusion in Ireland 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Ber rand Maître t
.
 
 
rt
   
 225 The Climate Preferences of Irish Tourists by 
Purpose of Travel 
  Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 224 A Hirsch Measure for the Quality of Research 
Supervision, and an Illustration with Trade 
Economists 
  Frances P  Ruane and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 223 Environmental Accounts for the Republic of 
Ireland: 1990-2005 
  Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
2007 222 Assessing Vulnerability of Selected Sectors under 
Environmental Tax Reform: The issue of pricing 
power 
 J. Fitz Gerald, M. Keeney and S. Scott 
 221 Climate Policy Versus Development Aid 
Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 220 Exports and Productivity – Comparable Evidence 
for 14 Countries 
The International Study Group on Exports and 
Productivity 
   
 219 Energy-Using Appliances and Energy-Saving 
Features: Determinants of Ownership in Ireland 
Joe O’Dohe y, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 218 The Public/Private Mix in Irish Acute Public 
Hospitals: Trends and Implications 
Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley 
   
 217 Regret About the Timing of First Sexual 
Intercourse: The Role of Age and Context 
Richard Layte, Hannah McGee 
   
   
   
 47
 216 Determinants of Water Connection Type and 
Ownership of Water-Using Appliances in Ireland 
Joe O’Dohe y, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol rt
r
r t
.
t
   
 215 Unemployment – Stage or Stigma?  
Being Unemployed During an Economic Boom 
Emer Smyth 
   
 214 The Value of Lost Load 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 213 Adolescents’ Educational Attainment and School 
Experiences in Contemporary Ireland 
Merike Darmody, Selina McCoy, Eme  Smyth 
   
 212 Acting Up or Opting Out? Truancy in Irish 
Secondary Schools 
Merike Darmody, Eme  Smy h and Selina McCoy 
   
 211 Where do MNEs Expand Production: Location 
Choices of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe 
after 1992 
Frances P  Ruane, Xiaoheng Zhang 
   
 210 Holiday Destinations: Understanding the Travel 
Choices of Irish Tourists 
Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 209 The Effectiveness of Competition Policy and the 
Price-Cost Margin: Evidence from Panel Data 
Patrick McCloughan, Seán Lyons and William Batt 
   
 208 Tax Structure and Female Labour Market 
Participation: Evidence from Ireland 
Tim Callan, A. Van Soest, J.R. Walsh 
   
 207 Distributional Effects of Public Education Transfers 
in Seven European Countries 
Tim Callan, Tim Smeeding and Panos Tsakloglou 
   
 206 The Earnings of Immigrants in Ireland: Results 
from the 2005 EU Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions 
Alan Barrett and Yvonne McCar hy 
   
 205 Convergence of Consumption Patterns During 
Macroeconomic Transition: A Model of Demand in 
Ireland and the OECD 
Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
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